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In The Moral Foundation of Economic Behavior, David C. Rose takes what 
 philosophers would call a genealogical approach to morality. Though he 
constructs a systematic and fairly detailed theory of morality, he does not 
defend the theory with intuition pumps or straightforward moral argument. 
His  approach to morality begins instead with this question: what work might 
morality do in an economic system with low transaction costs? How, in oth-
er words, might morality – that is, a set of widely and commonly held moral 
beliefs – itself contribute to making economic institutions more efficient by 
driving down transaction costs? The approach is genealogical – in the sense 
explained by Bernard Williams in Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton  University 
Press, 2002), it is a vindicating (or at least a non-debunking) genealogy – 
 because it rests on two assumptions: that the nature and content of moral-
ity derives from how it developed, and that we can understand how morality 
developed by asking how, within a scientifically realistic account of human 
nature, economic agents might have come to hold and act from a particular set 
of moral beliefs in their efforts to minimize the transaction costs inherent in 
the pursuit of cooperative goods. Unlike many other authors who take this ap-
proach, Rose does not discuss cooperation in the abstract but in its economic 
guise. His question is how morality helps us maximize economic efficiency by 
minimizing the transaction costs of opportunism.
The book has eleven chapters. In the first three, Rose sketches his approach 
and sets up his argument. The core of the account lies in Chapters 4 through 8. 
Chapter 9 pursues a debate with alternative social-scientific accounts of trust. 
The final two chapters summarize and point ahead to how this approach to 
morality might be extended to the development of culture more broadly. I’ll 
explain the most distinctive feature of Rose’s set-up and the two core problems 
that drive his argument. Then I’ll turn to the debate over trust. Let me note 
explicitly that while I’m writing for an audience of philosophers, Rose appears 
to regard himself as addressing only economists and other social scientists. 
He explicitly presents his argument as a morality-vindicating approach to eco-
nomics. But the structure of his argument, along with much of his rhetoric 
and many of his emphases, reveal that he is pursuing a genealogical approach 
to morality, and it is under that description that philosophers can most easily 
appreciate the argument’s value.
Rose’s explanatory target is the species of economic efficiency manifest-
ed when cooperators manage to avoid the transaction cost imposed by the 
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 possibility of what Rose calls (following Robert Frank) ‘golden opportunities.’ 
In acting on a golden opportunity, one confidently believes that one’s exploi-
tation of another’s cooperation will not be detected. The transaction costs 
 imposed by such cases cannot be avoided by appeal to external incentives, 
such as concern for one’s reputation, since a golden opportunity is defined as 
an opportunity for exploitation that will forever remain undetected. Rose espe-
cially targets a form of opportunism that exists in relational contracts wherein 
one party benefits by exploiting the discretion granted him by the exploited 
to act within the bounds of the contract. If A hires B to invest her money, for 
example, A may have no idea how to assess whether the investment strategies 
that B chooses for her are likely to maximize her profits. If the opportunity is 
‘golden,’ B’s exploitation of A is doubly intractable: B believes that A cannot 
assess his investment strategies, and B also believes that those who can assess 
his strategies will never learn that he has exploited the contract. Since external 
incentives will not work against such opportunism, Rose argues, we need in-
centives that function within the psychology of would-be exploiters. We need 
some reason to believe that a would-be exploiter will be motivated to avoid 
guilt produced by the exploitation just as such.
The two problems that drive Rose’s argument arise through complexi-
ties in how such a mechanism of guilt-avoidance might work. The ‘problem 
of  empathy’ (Chapter 6) forces us to look beyond small-group solutions. In a 
small-group setting, we may rely on guilt-avoidance grounded in sympathy, 
since (a) there will be significant harms undergone by the exploited and (b) 
the exploiter is in position to sympathize with the exploited insofar as the 
exploited is harmed. But in the large-group setting characteristic of a mod-
ern economy, we cannot expect that guilt-avoidance will be thus grounded in 
sympathy. Rose emphasizes that even if we could somehow pump up exploit-
ers’ capacity for sympathy (or for the empathy that lies at its core), the harm 
 created by the exploitation may be distributed across so many individuals that 
the harm to each individual is insignificant. The problem of empathy thus 
leads, genealogically speaking, to principled moral restraint, which grounds 
guilt-avoidance in the motivational nature of moral belief itself. Here Rose em-
braces a species of judgment internalism that he does not articulate as such or 
more broadly defend. His argument for it lies in the claim that without it we 
cannot solve the problem of empathy.
The problem of empathy, once solved, gives way to a second problem, the 
‘greater good rationalization problem’ (Chapter 7). The problem now is that 
even if we can expect an exploiter to be motivated by a belief in the wrong-
ness of exploiting us, we cannot assume that this belief won’t be overridden by 
another moral belief whose content in some way adverts to the greater good 
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done by the exploitation. As Rose observes (117), this problem – assuming it 
is one – goes to the heart of classical utilitarianism. Though Rose doesn’t de-
scribe it in these terms, we might view it as an interpersonal variation on the 
well-known ‘integrity objection’ to consequentialism. Here the problem is not 
that consequentialism undermines an individual’s integrity, by forcing her to 
serve the greater good even when doing so conflicts with her more personal 
commitments, but that it undermines the integrity of cooperative trust rela-
tions, by forcing the would-be truster to weigh the likelihood that the would-be 
trusted will defect in the service of some greater good. Unlike the intraper-
sonal  integrity objection, this interpersonal integrity objection is genealogical: 
the problem with consequentialism is that it creates economic  inefficiencies. 
Rose solves the problem by arguing that moral prohibitions are lexically prior 
to moral exhortations. If one’s moral beliefs include an exhortation to serve 
the greater good, one is permitted to act on that exhortation only when it 
does not conflict with the prohibition on exploiting cooperative agreements. 
This permission, again, has a genealogical basis: by endorsing it we decrease 
transaction costs on cooperative agreements and thereby increase economic 
efficiency.
Rose emphasizes the distinction between exhortations and prohibitions 
throughout the book and criticizes “modern theories of morality” (without 
naming any) for failing to give the distinction its due (78). But there are many 
reasons to believe that the distinction is less important than Rose makes it. 
Even if we set aside the reasons that appear to motivate skepticism about 
Rose’s methodology, we might wonder about the role of moral exhortation in 
promoting the ideal of well-integrated personal agency on which his entire 
approach depends. Why should we care to avoid our own future guilt? Why 
should we feel guilty when we sympathize with the harms we’ve caused? Why 
not let our sympathetic dispositions atrophy (perhaps by letting our empathet-
ic capacities atrophy)? The answer in each case articulates an ideal of personal 
or moral agency. Even if we are naturally disposed to sympathize with others 
and naturally capable of feeling guilt when we sympathize with harms we’ve 
caused, moral exhortations – that is, beliefs with the positive moral content 
that one ought to act or be a certain way – appear to play a crucial role in de-
veloping an appropriately guilt-avoidant moral character. It is hard to see how 
moral prohibitions could get the right sort of grip on us if we were not thus 
subject to moral exhortations.
While Rose’s approach to morality is genealogical, he makes one norma-
tive argument that does not appear to be genealogical. Throughout the book 
he conceptualizes cooperative relations in terms of trust, and in Chapter 9 
he  criticizes other social-scientific theories of trust for failing to frame these 
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 relations in terms that let us appreciate the important problems that arise for 
large-scale economic cooperation. The theories under criticism treat trust as 
something importantly different from mere reliance, locating the difference 
in a respect in which trust is affective or interpersonal, perhaps involving the 
trusted’s recognition of how the truster is relying on her, or the trusted’s iden-
tification of her good with an aspect of the truster’s good, or with the good 
of the relation itself. Such approaches to trust tend to treat the small-group 
context as paradigmatic of trust relations, and Rose’s genealogical argument 
depends on our having left behind those small-group relations in our pursuit 
of economic prosperity. His critique of alternative theories of trust is not 
 itself genealogical; it addresses the nature of trust, not how we must think of 
trust in order to pursue economic goods efficiently. And proponents of alter-
native theories may reply simply that Rose does not need to frame his issue in 
terms of trust. He could just as well describe his argument as revealing how 
the pursuit of prosperity does not depend on trust relations at all but instead 
on broader relations of economic reliance. That would prevent Rose from 
 articulating a debate that he wants to pursue with economists who downplay 
the importance of trust, but it would clarify his contribution to social-scientific 
and philosophical debates about trust.
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